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NEIL GORSUCH AND THE GINSBURG RULES
LORI A. RINGHAND & PAUL M. COLLINS, JR.*
I understand entirely the desire of everyone to want to know the views
that I might subscribe to personally, and get me to make commitments
about how I’d rule in future cases. . . . I’m not saying there’s any improper questions. There are only improper answers. And as a judge, as a
sitting judge, I’m bound by cano[n]s of ethics. . . . Those cano[n]s are
important. They’re important to me because if—if I did make a bunch of
campaign promises here, what’s that mean to the independent judiciary?
What does that mean to the litigants in front of it? What does that mean
for the future of this country? Those things are important to me, and
there’s a long line of judges who come before me and this is an unbroken
chain and I don’t want to be the weak link.
—Neil Gorsuch 1

When Justice Antonin Scalia died on February 13, 2016, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) immediately announced that the
U.S. Senate would refuse to consider any Supreme Court nomination sent
to it by President Barack Obama. 2 The reason, McConnell said, was that
“[t]he American people should have a voice in the selection of their next
Supreme Court Justice.” 3 Therefore, he continued, the Senate would not act
on any nomination until a new President was sworn in almost a year after
Scalia’s death. 4
*Lori A. Ringhand, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and J. Alton Hosch Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law, and Paul M. Collins, Jr., Professor of Political Science and Director
of Legal Studies, University of Massachusetts Amherst. We would like to thank the organizers, editors
and participants in the Chicago-Kent College of Law Supreme Court and American Politics Symposium
for their thoughtful feedback and exceptionally hard work in preparing this Article. Thank you also to
Professors Carolyn Shapiro and Christopher Schmidt for inviting us to participate in the symposium.
1. Senate Judiciary Committee—Hearing, FED. NEWS SERV., Mar. 22, 2017, 2017 WLNR
8947139, at 108 [hereinafter Gorsuch Transcript, Mar. 22, 2017].
2. Susan Davis, Senate Republicans Agree to Block Obama’s Supreme Court Nominee, NPR
(Feb. 23, 2016, 6:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/02/23/467860960/senate-republicans-agree-toblock-obamas-supreme-court-nominee [https://perma.cc/4Z2Q-U3HS].
3. Harper Neigid, McConnell: Don’t Replace Scalia Until After Election, THE HILL (Feb. 13,
2016, 6:27 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/269389-mcconnell-dont-replace-scalia-until-afterelection [https://perma.cc/NQ5E-CTAY].
4. Id.
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President Obama attempted to upend McConnell’s strategy by nominating a well-respected centrist jurist, Merrick Garland, to fill Scalia’s
seat. 5 McConnell didn’t bite: Judge Garland made some token office visits
to senators, but no hearings were held and no vote on his nomination was
taken. 6 When Donald Trump subsequently won an unexpected victory in
November and was inaugurated as President in January 2017, one of his
first acts was to nominate Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court. 7
Majority Leader McConnell quickly convened hearings. 8 During three
days of testimony, Judge Gorsuch, like dozens of Supreme Court nominees
before him, answered questions, in public and under oath, before the Senate
Judiciary Committee. Like his predecessors, he was asked about his background and judicial philosophy, and whether he agreed or disagreed with
particular Supreme Court cases. Also, like his predecessors, nominee Gorsuch answered some of those questions, but avoided direct responses to
others. In doing so, Gorsuch repeatedly invoked what he called the “Ginsburg Rule.” The “Ginsburg Rule” is a term used by not just Gorsuch but
also by senators and numerous Supreme Court commentators. It attributes
to Ruth Bader Ginsburg a “rule” prohibiting Supreme Court nominees from
signaling their preferences about cases and issues.
This Article examines this so-called rule, and its attribution to Justice
Ginsburg. We begin by exploring how past nominees have approached
controversial questions at their hearings. In doing so, we demonstrate that
the “Ginsburg Rule” is at best misnamed: the practice of claiming a professional privilege to not respond to certain types of questions predates the
Ginsburg nomination by decades. 9 We then examine Gorsuch’s invocation
of that privilege at his hearings, and contrast his use of the privilege with
5. Ariane de Vogue, How McConnell Won, and Obama Lost, the Merrick Garland Fight, CNN
(Nov. 9, 2016, 5:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/09/politics/merrick-garland-supremecourt/index.html [https://perma.cc/9YUT-3Q2Y].
6. Karoun Demirjian & Mike DeBonis, Senate Democrats Slam Republican Blockade as Garland
Visits
Capitol
Hill,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
17,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/03/17/merrick-garland-heads-to-capitolhill-after-being-nominated-to-the-supreme-court/?utm_term=.3df2a1ae9047
[https://perma.cc/93SANC8V].
7. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Mark Landler, Trump Nominates Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/supreme-courtnominee-trump.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/PP8B-WXBV].
8. Nolan D. McCaskill, McConnell Confident Senate Will Confirm Gorsuch by April 7,
POLITICO (Mar. 9, 2017, 10:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/mitch-mcconnell-neilgorsuch-confirmation-senate-235867 [https://perma.cc/EA2M-9MB8].
9. See also PAUL M. COLLINS, JR. & LORI A. RINGHAND, SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION
HEARINGS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 235–66 (2013), and DION FARGANIS & JUSTIN WEDEKING,
SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION HEARINGS IN THE U.S. SENATE: RECONSIDERING THE CHARADE 42–
71 (2014).
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Justice Ginsburg’s. In doing so, we show that if the “Ginsburg Rule” is
supposed to reflect the actual practice of Justice Ginsburg at her hearings, it
would be better conceived of as two rules: one governing when nominees
should not provide direct responses to certain types of questions, and a
second governing when they should.
These two rules, working together, constitute what we then call the
“Ginsburg Rules”: nominees can properly avoid giving direct responses
about currently contested issues likely to return to the Court, but also
should use their testimony to assure the senators and the public that they
accept the resolution of previously contested cases that are now part of our
constitutional canon.
Next, we use empirical data to examine the extent to which Justices
Ginsburg and Gorsuch complied with each of these rules. In doing so, we
develop a “responsiveness ratio” that incorporates both rules and creates an
apples-to-apples comparison of the relative responsiveness of nominees
across time. The responsiveness ratio demonstrates that Gorsuch, despite
his insistence to the contrary, did not really follow the example set by Justice Ginsburg. Rather, Gorsuch’s responsiveness ratio was the lowest of
any nominee since 1968, while Ginsburg’s in contrast was one of the five
highest historically, and was on par with other contemporary nominees.
We close by addressing the question posed by Gorsuch himself in the
quotation at the start of this Article: what does it mean for the future of the
country if nominees follow Gorsuch’s practice and refuse to answer questions about even our most canonical constitutional cases? We believe that
the potential consequences of such a practice are grave. As we have
demonstrated in our earlier work, the confirmation hearings function as a
high-profile public forum in which we as a nation affirm our shared constitutional commitments. If future nominees follow Gorsuch in refusing to
provide firm opinions on even our most iconic cases, we lose an important
tool in ensuring that the individuals selected to serve on the Supreme Court
accept the constitutional settlements reached by each generation of Americans.
I. THE PRIVILEGE EXPLAINED
Supreme Court nominees have not always testified before the Senate
Judiciary Committee. The first nominee to take unrestricted questions in
public and under oath was Felix Frankfurter in 1939. 10 The practice became

10. COLLINS & RINGHAND, supra note 9, at 35.
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standard with the nomination of John Marshall Harlan in 1955. 11 All nominees who have testified, however—including Frankfurter and Harlan—
have consistently refused to provide firm answers to questions about contemporaneously contested constitutional cases and issues. 12 In doing so,
nominees have invoked two concerns: the need to preserve the appearance
of fairness and impartiality in the eyes of future litigants by not appearing
to prejudge cases that may come before the Court; and the importance of
protecting judicial independence by avoiding making inappropriate commitments to members of the Senate Judiciary Committee in exchange for
confirmation to the Supreme Court. 13
As noted by various scholars, these two concerns are related but distinct. 14 The first is about the appearance of fairness in relation to future
litigants, and stems from the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 5 of
the Model Code prohibits judges from engaging in certain types of behaviors that could reasonably imply a bias in future cases. 15 So, for example,
section 5A(3)(d) states that judicial candidates should not:
with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges, promises or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial[ ] performance of the adjudicative duties of the
office. 16

The official commentary to this Canon states that, as a “corollary” to
this provision, a “candidate should emphasize in any public statement the
candidate’s duty to uphold the law regardless of his or her personal
views.” 17 Supreme Court nominees testifying before the Senate Judiciary
Committee frequently invoke this language when asserting that answering
particular questions would interfere with the appearance of impartiality in
future cases.

11. Id. at 37–38.
12. Id. at 234–35. In our earlier work, we defined a “privileged” response as one in which the
nominee refuses to answer a question on privileged grounds, meaning that the nominee indicated that
answering the question would create the reality or appearance of bias; would interfere with judicial
independence, or would be in appropriate for some other, similar reason. See Lori A. Ringhand & Paul
M. Collins, Jr., May it Please the Senate: An Empirical Analysis of the Senate Judiciary Committee
Hearings of Supreme Court Nominees, 1939–2009, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 589 (2011).
13. COLLINS & RINGHAND, supra note 9.
14. Id. See generally Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in Judicial
Confirmation
Hearings,
115
YALE
L.J.
POCKET
PART
38
(2006),
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1173&context=fss_papers
[https://perma.cc/E88X-3VT4].
15. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1999).
16. Id. § 5(A)(3)(d)(i).
17. Id. § 5A(3)(d) cmt.
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The second idea, in contrast, is based in the federal judiciary’s status
as a branch of government separate and institutionally independent from
the U.S. Senate. 18 While less fleshed out than the Model Code’s prohibitions, the idea here is that a nominee should not have to pledge herself to
certain outcomes as a condition of confirmation, and that doing so would
give the Senate inappropriate influence over the Supreme Court. 19 This
rationale is invoked by nominees when they refuse to answer questions on
the basis that senators should not solicit “promises” of future behavior as
part of the confirmation process. 20
Both of these concerns are relevant and important in considering how
the confirmation process of U.S. Supreme Court Justices should be structured. Neither, however, provides clear standards regarding how far nominees should go when responding to questions about previously decided
constitutional cases or controversies. As Robert Post and Reva Siegel have
pointed out, any judge or justice who has written or signed on to an opinion
involving an issue that may come before the Court in the future has provided the same information—and thus presents the same risk regarding the
appearance of future impartiality—as does a nominee who tells the Judiciary Committee whether she agrees or disagrees with the outcome or reasoning of an existing Supreme Court decision. 21 Likewise, concerns about
institutional independence provide little concrete guidance on how to balance the needs of an independent judiciary with the duty of the political
branches in providing a check on judicial power through the constitutionally compelled nomination and confirmation of Supreme Court Justices. 22
Consequently, nominees’ invocation of the privilege to not respond to certain questions is rarely uncontroversial and frequently sparks vigorous debate among senators, commentators, and scholars.
II. THE GORSUCH HEARING
Given this uncertainty about the ground rules, and the contested political environment of the Gorsuch hearing, it is hardly a surprise that Neil
Gorsuch claimed at his hearing a broad privilege to not answer questions
about previously decided Supreme Court cases or controversies. More so
than other recent nominees, however, Gorsuch also was quite vocal in attributing his understanding of the scope of that privilege to the so-called
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Post & Siegel, supra note 14, at 45.
Id. at 45–48.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 46–47.
See id. at 45.
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“Ginsburg Rule.” This nomenclature, used repeatedly by Gorsuch and
senators, reflects the widespread belief that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s
testimony at her 1993 confirmation hearing both shepherded in and exemplified a modern practice of nominees refusing to answer questions on the
privileged grounds discussed above. 23
Republican members of the Senate Judiciary Committee introduced
the privilege at the very start of the Gorsuch hearing, and defined it broadly. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), for example, used his opening statement to
instruct Gorsuch to avoid answering any questions Gorsuch found inappropriate. Hatch framed the issue as representing a choice between Gorsuch
being perceived as an “impartial judge” or a “political judge.” 24 An impartial judge, Hatch said, “focuses on the process of interpreting and applying
the law according to objective rules,” while a political judge “focuses on a
desired result and fashions a means of achieving it.” 25 Senators needed to
take care, Hatch warned his colleagues, to respect the difference, and ensure their questioning of Gorsuch did not lead the nominee into the inappropriate territory of politics:
A senator . . . who wants to know which side a nominee will be on in future cases or who demands the judge be [an] advocate for certain political interests clearly has a politicized judiciary in mind. . . . Something is
seriously wrong when the confirmation process for a Supreme Court justice resembles an election campaign for political office. 26

Other Republican senators expanded on Hatch’s comments. Senator
John Cornyn (R-TX) raised the concern of future accusations of bias should
Gorsuch answer inappropriate questions. “Can you imagine,” Cornyn said,
“what a litigant might think if the judge before whom he or she was to present their case said before they heard a word how they were going to decide
the case? That’s why it’s improper for you, as you know, to prejudge cases
in your testimony before the committee.” 27 Senator John Kennedy (R-LA)
agreed, expressing his hope that the senators would avoid substantive questioning and instead “focus on temperament, on legal philosophy, on legal

23. DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41300, QUESTIONING SUPREME COURT
NOMINEES ABOUT THEIR VIEWS ON LEGAL OR CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: A RECURRING ISSUE 6
(2010).
24. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Hearing on the Nomination of Neil Gorsuch to Be Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, FED. NEWS. SERV., Mar. 20, 2017, 2017 WLNR 8698078, at 8–9
[hereinafter Gorsuch Transcript, Mar. 20, 2017].
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 14.
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reasoning, on qualifications, on experience.” 28 Judiciary Committee Chair
Chuck Grassley (R-IA), in turn, added the separation of powers point:
It’s odd that some of the same folks who will claim that you’re not independent from the [P]resident will turn around and . . . try to extract from
you promises and commitments before they pass judgment on your nomination. . . .
....
You’re going to be asked to make promises and commitments about
how you’ll rule on particular issues. Now, they won’t necessarily ask
you that directly . . . [.]
Instead they’ll probably ask you about old cases, whether they were
correctly decided. Of course, that’s another way of asking the very same
question. They know that you can’t answer, but they’re going to ask you
anyway. 29

Grassley, like many of his colleagues, then explicitly attributed this
rule to Justice Ginsburg. “[I]t’s what we call the Ginsburg standard,” he
said. 30
Gorsuch readily took the hint. When Grassley asked Gorsuch his opinion about the personal right to bear arms established in District of Columbia v. Heller, 31 Gorsuch said he would “respectfully respond that it is a
precedent of the United States Supreme Court,” but would say nothing else
on the topic. 32 Grassley asked Gorsuch the same question about Citizens
United v. Federal Elections Commission, 33 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 34 Gideon v. Wainwright, 35 Bush v. Gore, 36 Roe v. Wade, 37 and Griswold v. Connecticut. 38 To each of Grassley’s inquiries, Gorsuch essentially
replied: “Respectfully, Senator, I give you the same answer.” 39

28. Id. at 47. Senator Kennedy went on, somewhat colorfully, to state that “I guess what I want is
a cross between Socrates and Dirty Harry. And I believe you just might be that person.” Id. at 48.
29. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Hearing on the Nomination of Neil Gorsuch to Be Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, FED. NEWS SERV., Mar. 21, 2017, 2017 WLNR 8821289, at 4–6
[hereinafter Gorsuch Transcript, Mar. 21, 2017].
30. Id. at 6.
31. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
32. Gorsuch Transcript, Mar. 21, 2017, supra note 29, at 6–7.
33. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
34. 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
35. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
36. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
39. Gorsuch Transcript, Mar. 21, 2017, supra note 29, at 7; see id. at 7–8.
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An exchange between Gorsuch and Senator Thom Tillis (R-NC) exemplifies the synergistic way the nominee and the senators talked about the
nominee’s privilege to not provide opinions on even the most well-settled
cases:
Tillis: [W]ould you consider it an inappropriate question for me to get
you to answer a question that would be in violation of the code of conduct for United States judges? Would you consider than an inappropriate
question?
Gorsuch: Senator, I—questions aren’t inappropriate. Answers would be
inappropriate. I’m the one whose bound by my code of conduct. . . .
....
Tillis: These folks don’t get it. They realize that you were following a
code of conduct and you answer the questions to the best of your ability
within the guidelines that you as a judge have.
. . . You haven’t side-stepped a single one. You’ve answered every
one to the best of your ability within the guidelines that you have as a sitting judge. . . .
. . . There was never an instance over the course of these last three
days where you wavered.” 40

In explaining his refusal to answer questions about Griswold, Gorsuch
neatly invoked both aspects of the privilege within a single statement:
If I were to start telling you which are my favorite precedents or which
are my least favorite precedents or if I view a precedent in that fashion, I
would be tipping my hand and suggesting to litigants that I’ve already
made up my mind about their cases. That’s not a fair judge. . . .
And then [there is] the independence problem. If it looks like I’m
giving hints or previews or intimations about how I might rule . . . I think
that’s the beginning of the end of the independent judiciary if—if judges
have to make effectively campaign promises for confirmation. 41

Gorsuch’s reluctance to affirm existing law extended even to perhaps
the single most iconic case in the current constitutional canon: Brown v.
Board of Education. 42 His exchange with Senator Blumenthal about that
case is worth reading in full:
Blumenthal: Let me ask you. Did you agree or do—I’m sorry, do you
agree with the result in Brown v. Board of Education?
Gorsuch: Senator, Brown v. Board of Education corrected an erroneous
decision—a badly erroneous decision—and vindicated a dissent by the

40. Gorsuch Transcript, Mar. 22, 2017, supra note 1, at 104.
41. Gorsuch Transcript, Mar. 21, 2017, supra note 29, at 8 (emphasis added).
42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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first Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson where he correctly identified
that separate to advantage [sic] one race can never be equal.
Blumenthal: And do you agree with—with the result?
Gorsuch: In Plessy? No. . . .
Blumenthal: . . . you agree with the result in Board v.—Brown v. Board?
Gorsuch: Brown v. Board of Education, Senator, was a correct application of the law of precedent and . . .
Blumenthal: You agree with it?
Gorsuch: Senator, it is a correct application of the law of precedent.
Blumenthal: By the way, when Chief Justice Roberts testified before this
committee and he was asked by Senator Kennedy quote do you agree
with the court[‘]s conclusion? Meaning in Brown, that the segregation of
children in public schools solely on the basis of race is unconstitutional.
Judge Robert[s] answered unequivocally quote, “I do.”
Gorsuch: Senator . . .
Blumenthal: Would you agree with Judge Roberts?
Gorsuch: Senator, there’s no—there’s—there’s no daylight, here.
Blumenthal: OK. 43

It is difficult to know what to make of this exchange. It is unlikely that
Gorsuch was expressing disagreement with Brown, but nor was he willing
to simply affirm it as had Roberts (and every other nominee testifying before the Judiciary Committee in recent decades). The most likely explanation for the exchange may be that Gorsuch simply was unwilling to express
an opinion on virtually any case, no matter how canonical. This understanding certainly is supported by his responses throughout the hearing: at
the end of the process, Gorsuch had provided firm responses on just a
handful of issues. He agreed that Plessy v. Ferguson 44 and Korematsu v.
United States 45 were wrongly decided, he affirmed two early privacy cases
(Meyer v. Nebraska 46 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters 47), and he accepted as
correct the Court’s opinions in Gideon v. Wainwright 48 and Marbury v.
Madison. 49
Gorsuch’s reticence drew frustrated reactions from several Democratic
senators. In addition to the above back-and-forth regarding Brown, Blu-

43. Gorsuch Transcript, Mar. 21, 2017, supra note 29, at 145.
44. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
45. 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Gorsuch Transcript, Mar. 21, 2017, supra note 29, at 160; see also
Gorsuch Transcript, Mar. 22, 2017, supra note 1, at 142.
46. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Gorsuch Transcript, Mar. 21, 2017, supra note 29 at 127.
47. 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Gorsuch Transcript, Mar. 21, 2017, supra note 29, at 127.
48. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
49. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Gorsuch Transcript, Mar. 21., 2017, supra note 29, at 22.
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menthal noted that as nominees both Justice Samuel Alito and Chief Justice
John Roberts had accepted as correct the results reached by the Supreme
Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird 50 and Griswold. 51 Senator Al Franken (D-MN)
likened the hearings to a “job interview” and complained that Gorsuch’s
refusal to answer hindered the senators’ ability to fulfill their constitutional
duty. 52 Senator Mazie Hirono (D-HI) captured the Democratic senators’
frustration in her closing remarks: “I wish,” she said to Gorsuch, “that I
could say that this hearing has been illuminating for what was said by you.
Instead, I’m left to judge your nomination largely on the basis of what you
refuse to say.” 53
III. THE GINSBURG RULES
As discussed above, Gorsuch, like the senators, repeatedly tied his reticence to answer questions to Justice Ginsburg. Asked about Roe and
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 54 then about Bowers v. Hardwick, 55 Lawrence v. Texas, 56 Brown and Loving v. Virginia, 57 Gorsuch quoted Ginsburg’s 1993 testimony:
I’ve also said, Senator . . . once a judge starts committing, promising,
hinting, previewing, forecasting, agreeing or disagreeing with precedent
at this confirmation table, we’re in the process then of campaign promises. And we’re in that process, Senator, I fear, of judges having to make
commitments, tacit promises, hints, previews, as Justice Ginsburg called
them, in order to become confirmed. Once we do that, I’m fearful for the
independence of judiciary. 58

So was Gorsuch’s unwillingness to engage with senatorial questioning
merely replicating the practice of prior nominees in general and Justice
Ginsburg in particular? Answering this question requires a more nuanced
understanding of nominees’ prior practice, and of the so-called “Ginsburg
Rule” itself.
This Part explores those issues. In doing so, we show two things: 1)
the practice of Supreme Court nominees refusing to answer certain ques50. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
51. To which Gorsuch replied, “to say I agree or I disagree with a precedent of the United States
Supreme Court, as a judge, that’s an act of hubris that to me just doesn’t feel like a judicial function.”
Gorsuch Transcript, Mar. 22, 2017, supra note 1, at 91–92.
52. Id. at 129–30.
53. Id. at 143.
54. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
55. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
56. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
57. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
58. Gorsuch Transcript, Mar. 22, 2017, supra note 1, at 93.
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tions posed by members of the Senate Judiciary Committee predates Justice
Ginsburg nomination by decades; and 2) Justice Ginsburg’s own practice
was more nuanced than frequently claimed, and should be more accurately
referred to as the “Ginsburg Rules”—one of which Gorsuch complied with
and one of which he did not.
The very first nominee to take unrestricted questions from the Senate
Judiciary Committee in public and under oath invoked the privilege to not
answer questions. Nominated in 1939, Felix Frankfurter opened his testimony with this:
I should think it improper for a nominee no less than for a member of the
Court to express his personal views on controversial political issues affecting the Court . . . I should think it not only bad taste but inconsistent
with the duties of the office for which I have been nominated for me to
attempt to supplement my past record by present declarations. 59

John Marshall Harlan followed Frankfurter’s example in his 1955
hearing. Harlan refused to opine on a then-hotly contested issue about
whether a treaty can “be paramount” to domestic law. 60 In doing so, Harlan
invoked the privilege in language that is, to contemporary ears, more familiar than Frankfurter’s:
I am not one of those who believes that the Senate Judiciary Committee
should be a rubber stamp in exercising its constitutional responsibility in
participating in nominations. I am not of that school of thought. And that
is why I am here. By the same token, I am sure that the members of the
committee would recognize that under our scheme of things that a nominee to high judicial office would commit the gravest indiscretion, and I
may add, impropriety, in expressing views as to how he would vote on
issues that have not yet come before him and may come before him as a
member of the Court. 61

59. Nomination of Felix Frankfurter to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 107–08 (1939) [hereinafter Frankfurter Transcript].
60. Nomination of John Marshall Harlan, of New York, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 137–38 (1955)
(statement of Sen. Eastland, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). This issue was hotly contested
because of Southern senators’ concerns about the effect of international human rights treaties on their
states’ racially discriminatory practices on their states’ racially discriminatory practices.
61. Id. at 139.
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Figure 1. Percentage of Privileged Responses, 1939–2017

As shown in Figure 1, Frankfurter and Harlan exemplify a practice
common to all nominees appearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Figure 1 contains information on the percentage of privileged responses
each nominee gave at his or her hearing. The data from 1939–2010 come
from The U.S. Supreme Court Confirmation Hearing Database, 62 which
contains information on every question asked and every answer given at
each hearing at which the nominee appeared in open session and took unrestricted questions while under oath. The data for Gorsuch were collected
for this Article using the coding rules developed in that database. 63 The unit
of analysis in the dataset, which constitutes more than 31,000 observations,
is the change of speaker, meaning a new observation begins whenever the
speaker changes (e.g., from senator to nominee).
Privileged responses are those in which the nominee refuses to answer
a question on the ground that answering would create the reality or appear62. Paul M. Collins, Jr. & Lori A. Ringhand, The U.S. Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings
AT
UMASS
AMHERST:
PAUL
M.
COLLINS,
JR.,
Database,
BLOGS
https://blogs.umass.edu/pmcollins/data/ [https://perma.cc/H4X6-7A2B].
63. Though we are confident in the conclusions drawn in this Article, we note that the Gorsuch
hearing was coded from unofficial transcripts (Federal News Service) and has not yet been subjected to
a full reliability analysis.
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ance of bias, would interfere with judicial independence, or would be inappropriate for some other, similar reason. 64 A nominee indicates a privileged
response when the nominee or the senator refers back to a previously asserted definition of the privilege to not respond, or answers a question by
describing the scope of the privilege being asserted. 65 The privilege variable does not include instances in which the nominee evades a senator’s
question but does not provide a privileged reason for the evasion. 66
As shown in Figure 1, Ginsburg invoked the privilege in just over 10
percent (10.3 percent) of her hearing comments. Plainly, however, the practice did not begin with her, and nor did she invoke the privilege the most
often. All but three nominees (Jackson, Whittaker and White) invoked the
privilege at some point during their hearings. Abe Fortas, at his confirmation hearings for Chief Justice, did so the highest percentage of the time
(24.9 percent). William Brennan in 1957 (14.6 percent) and William
Rehnquist in his 1971 Associate Justice hearing (12.4 percent) also gave
more privileged answers than did Ginsburg. Nominees Harlan (5.0 percent), Thurgood Marshall (6.8 percent), Antonin Scalia (8.1 percent), and
Roberts (6.5 percent) also each gave privileged responses in at least 5 percent of their comments.
Gorsuch’s privileged response rate was 6.6 percent. This puts him
closer to this later group than to Ginsburg, with a response rate most similar to Roberts’. In terms of invocation of the privilege, then, Gorsuch is
correct in asserting that he followed Ginsburg’s lead, and in fact gave even
fewer privileged responses than did she.
The issues and cases underlying these numbers further illustrate the
ways in which nominees have used the privilege to not respond to avoid
opining on the most hotly contested issues of their eras. For example, in his
1965 hearing for Associate Justice, Abe Fortas refused to answer certain
questions, invoking the privilege when asked about the effect of Reynolds
v. Sims 67 on the apportionment of the U.S. Senate (decided in 1964, and
constitutionalizing the “one-person-one-vote” rule for legislative districting). Three years later, in his hearing for Chief Justice, Fortas also refused
to answer questions about the freshly-decided Katzenbach v. Morgan 68

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Nomination of Abe Fortas To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 54 (1965).
68. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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(upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965). 69 In 1968, unsuccessful nominee Homer Thornberry invoked the privilege in regard to the constitutionality of poll taxes, 70 and both Thornberry and William Brennan (in 1957)
refused to answer pointed questions about constitutional protections available to communists. 71
Sex and gender questions also were among the issues earlier nominees
frequently avoided answering questions about. The issue of gender discrimination first appeared at the 1970 hearing of another unsuccessful nominee,
Harrold Carswell. Carswell invoked the privilege in declining to answer a
question about whether an employer could refuse to hire mothers with
young children. 72 Most recent nominees have refused to answer questions
about sexual orientation discrimination and the right to marriage equality. 73
To contemporary ears, the most striking invocation of the privilege
may come from Potter Stewart, testifying in 1959, just four years after
Brown v. Board of Education was decided. Like Gorsuch, Stewart avoided
directly affirming the constitutional correctness of Brown. Unlike Gorsuch,
he worked hard to not even indirectly signal his agreement or disagreement
with the decision. When asked by Senator John McClellan (D-AR) whether
he agreed with the “reasoning and logic applied, or the lack of application
of either or both as the case may be,” Stewart said, “it is a question that I
have never directly asked myself. I was a Circuit Judge, exactly the same
time as that particular decision was announced.” 74 The exchange continued
as follows:
McClellan: I am not asking you do you favor segregation, integration or
anything else. I am asking you this – I am thinking in terms of what is
now, what the many think is the law of the land, the decision that was
reached. Now I am asking you, do you agree with the view, the reasoning and logic applied or the lack of application of either or both, as the
case may be, and the philosophy expressed by the Supreme Court in arriving at its decision in the case of Brown vs. Board of Education on
May 17, 1954?

69. Nomination of Abe Fortas, of Tennessee, to Be Chief Justice of the United States and Nomination of Homer Thornberry, of Texas, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 181–82 (1968).
70. See, e.g., id. at 263–66.
71. Id. at 273–74; Nomination of William Joseph Brennan, Junior, of New Jersey, to Be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th
Cong. 19–20 (1957).
72. Nomination of George Harrold Carswell, of Florida, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 40–41 (1970).
73. COLLINS & RINGHAND, supra note 9.
74. Nomination of Potter Stewart to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 34 (1959).
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Stewart: That question I think I could not answer with an unqualified
“yes” or “no.” And I am still in all honesty influenced by the fact then, as
I say, having been a Circuit Judge, the law of the land is, at least it is to a
lawyer you tell them, until that decision is changed that is the law.75

Senators McClellan, John Carroll (D-CO), Thomas Hennings, Jr. (DMO) and Sam Ervin, Jr. (D-NC) then embarked on a long exchange about
whether Stewart should or should not answer the question. Senator McClellan said he needed a yes or no answer in order for him to perform his duty
in regard to the confirmation. 76 Carroll raised a point of order, arguing that
it was not “proper” for a nominee to make a commitment to the committee
and thus “shackle and trammel his free exercise of his own intellect, of his
own power to determine and to decide cases that come before him.” 77
Senator Ervin responded:
[I]s it that we are to try to find out what the knowledge of the nominee of
the Supreme Court is with reference to what has been decided in the law,
and ought not be permitted to find out what his attitude is toward the
Constitution, or what his philosophy is? And if that is so, I don’t see
why . . . the Constitution was so foolish as to suggest that the nominee
for the Supreme Court ought to be confirmed by the Senate. 78

The senators debated the point of order for an extraordinary nineteen
pages of the printed transcript, including four separate calls for a roll call
vote, before Senator Carroll withdrew his point of order after being reassured by the committee chair that Stewart would be allowed to decline to
answer the question if he believed the question was improper. 79 In the end,
the only answer Stewart gave was this:
Senator McClellan, the way that question is phrased I cannot conscientiously give you a simple “yes” or simple “no” answer. . . . I am here because I recognize the duty of the United States Senate under the
Constitution with respect to appointments to the Federal Judiciary and
the duty to find out all about me and to conscientiously get what you feel
you need to know and therefore, I will try to first, tell you why I cannot.
There are now pending in the court several, many, cases in which the
reasoning of that particular thing is relied upon by at least one of the parties. Therefore, the decision inevitably will involve in that case consideration by the Court of that question.
If I give a simple “yes” or “no” answer to your conscientiously phrased
question, therefore, it would not only disqualify my participation pending in cases and heaven only knows how many future cases, but it seems
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 43–44.
Id. at 59.
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to me it would involve a serious problem of simple judicial ethics. It
would or might be construed in a case as prejudice on my part, one way
or the other, about cases that are before the court and now pending.
However, I recognize the United States Senate, as I said at the beginning,
your duty to it. And therefore I can partially answer your question. . . . Let me say this so there will be no misunderstanding with this
thought in mind. I would not like you to vote for me for the top position
that I am dedicated to because I am for overturning that decision, because I am not. I have no pre-judgment against that decision. 80

As these excerpts demonstrate, the practice of Supreme Court nominees asserting a privilege to not answer certain questions plainly began well
before Justice Ginsburg’s 1993 hearing. All nominees testifying before the
Senate Judiciary Committee have answered some questions while refusing
to answer others. 81 Ginsburg’s articulation of the privilege differed from
earlier nominees only perhaps in the colorful language she used in her
opening statement, which included her now much-quoted insistence on
offering “no forecasts, no hints”:
Judges in our system are bound to decide concrete cases, not abstract issues; each case is based on particular facts and its decision should turn
on those facts and the governing law, stated and explained in light of the
particular arguments the parties or their representatives choose to present. A judge sworn to decide impartially can offer no forecasts, no hints,
for that would show not only disregard for the specifics of the particular
case, it would display disdain for the entire judicial process. 82

Consistent with this articulation, and with the practice of previous
nominees, Ginsburg refused to answer questions about the hot button issues
which, in 1993, were certain to return in short order to the Court. She refused to opine on the then undecided understanding of the Second Amendment as including a personal right to bear arms, 83 the constitutionality of
private school vouchers, 84 the constitutionality of same-sex education, 85 the
“racial gerrymandering” claims recognized by the Court earlier that year in
Shaw v Reno, 86 the consequences of a proposed balanced budget amendment, 87 the proper role of sexual orientation in child custody disputes, 88 the
80. Id. at 63.
81. For a more in-depth analysis of nominee responsiveness, see COLLINS & RINGHAND, supra
note 9.
82. Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 55 (1993) [hereinafter
Ginsburg Transcript].
83. Id. at 128, 242.
84. Id. at 140.
85. Id. at 141.
86. Id. at 144, 253.
87. Id. at 144–45.
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constitutionality of the death penalty, 89 and the use of heightened review
for sexual orientation discrimination. 90 Ginsburg also declined to comment
on the appropriate parameters of the contested First Amendment doctrines
set out in Buckley v. Valeo, 91 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 92
Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission, 93 and
Wisconsin v. Mitchell. 94 Each of these issues was, at the time of Ginsburg’s
confirmation hearing, actively contested and thus fell into her “no forecasts, no hints” prohibition regarding cases likely to come before the Court
in the near future.
But despite her association with and liberal use of the privilege, Justice Ginsburg was careful in how she invoked it. In the same opening
statement in which she stressed the importance of not appearing to prejudge cases likely to come before the Court, she also made clear her understanding that the open-textured language of many contested constitutional
provisions underscored the Senate’s duty to consider Supreme Court nominees in terms of their likely opinions. The Constitution, she said, belongs
not to the Court or the Justices, but to “We, the People.” 95 Supreme Court
Justices, she went on,
participate in shaping a lasting body of constitutional decisions. They
continuously confront matters on which the Framers left things unsaid,
unsettled, or uncertain. For that reason, when the Senate considers a Supreme Court nomination, the Senators are properly concerned about the
nominee’s capacity to serve the Nation, not just for the here and now, but
over the long term. . . .
....
. . . Judges, I am mindful, owe the elected branches—the Congress
and the President—respectful consideration of how court opinions affect
their responsibilities. 96

We could think of this part of Ginsburg’s confirmation approach as
setting out a second Ginsburg Rule: while nominees have a professional
duty to refrain from previewing their opinion about cases and issues likely
to come before the Court in the future, they also have a duty to be mindful

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 146.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 322–23.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
395 U.S. 367 (1969).
508 U.S. 476 (1993); Ginsburg Transcript, supra note 82, at 351–52, 357.
See Ginsburg Transcript, supra note 82, at 51.
Id. at 51–53.
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of their obligations to Congress and the country over time when interpreting under-determinate constitutional text.
Figure 2. Percentage of Firm Responses, 1939–2017

Figure 2 provides information on the percentage of statements nominees made in which the nominees did just that: took firm positions on specific legal issues. Nominee responses are coded as “firm” when a nominee
provides a firm, current position on a clearly identified legal issue or case.
Overall, nominees provide firm positions in about 4 percent of statements.
By this measure, Ginsburg was the most responsive nominee in the data.
She gave firm answers in 15.4 percent of her comments—more than any
other nominee who has testified before the Committee. Rehnquist, testifying at his Associate Justice hearing in 1971, was her closest competitor,
giving firm responses 11.5 percent of the time. Rehnquist was followed by
Justices Thomas (10.1 percent), Alito (9.7 percent) and Stevens (9.3 percent). Gorsuch, in contrast, give firm responses less than 1 percent of the
time.
In taking firm positions on previously contested constitutional issues,
nominees use their testimony to assure the senators and the nation that they

2018]

THE GINSBURG RULES

493

concur with the existing constitutional consensus. Justice Ginsburg did this
repeatedly and across an array of issue areas, notwithstanding her formulation of the judicial canon of ethics, or her self-described prohibition on
providing “no forecasts; no previews, no hints” Ginsburg affirmed Griswold, Eisenstadt, and—atypically—Roe. 97 She also affirmed that gender
discrimination required heightened scrutiny, 98 that there is a constitutional
right to privacy in regard to personal autonomy, 99 and that Marbury v.
Madison was correctly decided. 100 She unequivocally stated that Dred Scott
v. Sandford 101 and Korematsu were wrongly decided, 102 and that she had
“no difficulty” with the test set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 103 She agreed
that the Lochner-era cases were wrong, 104 and affirmed Gibbons v. Ogden, 105 Brown, and the now-celebrated dissenting opinions in Abrams v.
United States 106 and Gitlow v. New York. 107 She also endorsed Justice
Brandeis’s concurring opinions in Whitney v California 108 and the Court’s
opinion in Brandenburg v. Ohio. 109 She affirmed that the First Amendment
properly protected more than just political speech, 110 and celebrated Taylor
v. Louisiana’s finding that women have a right to serve on juries. 111
Ginsburg’s willingness to opine on these canonical cases and doctrines
was noted even by opposing-party senators. While complaining that Ginsburg was “not very specific” on the death penalty, Senator Hatch nonetheless noted her specificity on abortion, equal rights and “a number of other
issues.” 112 It appears, then, that the “Ginsburg Rule” is really the “Ginsburg
Rules”: nominees should not preview how they may decide cases or issues
97. Id. at 207.
98. Id. at 164.
99. Id. at 185.
100. Id. at 188.
101. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
102. Ginsburg Transcript, supra note 82, at 210.
103. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Ginsburg Transcript, supra note 82, at 212.
104. Ginsburg Transcript, supra note 82, at 288.
105. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
106. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
107. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
108. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
109. 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Ginsburg Transcript, supra note 82, at 312–13.
110. Ginsburg Transcript, supra note 82, at 314–15.
111. 419 U.S. 522 (1975); see Ginsburg Transcript at 317–18.
112. Ginsburg Transcript, supra note 82, at 263. Echoing the perpetual frustration of opposing-party senators, Senator Hatch said: “The thing I am worried about is that it appears that your willingness to discuss the established principles of constitutional law may depend somewhat on whether
your answer might solicit a favorable response form the committee.” Id. at 264. He then noted that as
nominees, Justices Thomas and Souter had at their confirmation hearings each provided more specific
answers to the death penalty, which provoked Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH) to add that Justice
Kennedy, like Ginsburg, had avoided answering those same questions. Id. at 265–66.
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likely to come before the Court, but they also should respect the role of the
Senate in the confirmation process by affirming their acceptance, in public
and under oath, of those previously controversial constitutional issues
which by the time of their nomination are well-settled and firmly within the
contemporary constitutional canon.
Ginsburg was not atypical in taking this two-tiered approach in her
testimony. Earlier nominees have done so as well, as Figure 2 reveals. They
have claimed a privilege to not answer questions about currently controversial cases and doctrines, while also affirming their acceptance of a core set
of constitutional choices as both settled law and constitutionally correct.
These nominees, named by Democratic and Republican Presidents, and
testifying before Democratic and Republican Senate majorities, affirmed
Griswold, agreed that gender discrimination warrants heightened scrutiny,
that the Constitution protects at least a basic privacy right, that non-textual
liberty interests are protected under the substantive Due Process Clause,
and that the First Amendment protects more than political speech. 113 In
fact, as we have demonstrated in an exhaustive study of all confirmation
testimony given in unrestricted and open session before the Senate Judiciary Committee, every nominee since 1987 had affirmed each of these core
tenants of today’s constitutional canon.
IV. THE RESPONSIVENESS RATIO
We now turn to evaluating the extent to which Ginsburg and Gorsuch
avoided responding by invoking the privilege and also the extent to which
they gave firm answers to questions about concrete doctrines and cases.
Together, these two response types provide a comprehensive picture of
nominee responsiveness at the Judiciary Committee hearings.
We begin by examining the issues and subissues in which Ginsburg
and Gorsuch most frequently invoked privilege. These issue and subissue
categories are primarily based on the Policy Agendas Project codebook, 114
with several confirmation hearing-specific categories added. Overall, there
are thirty-four issue categories and hundreds of subissue categories that
each statement can conceivably fall into. Each statement falls into a single
issue area and can be included in up to six subissue areas (although most
fall into a single subissue area).

113. See generally COLLINS & RINGHAND, supra note 9.
114. COMPARATIVE
AGENDAS
PROJECT,
[https://perma.cc/TC25-BMK8].

http://www.comparativeagendas.net
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There are limitations to this coding system. For example, the “Issue
Area” code displayed on Tables 1 and 2 refers to the main issue raised in
the comment being coded. In some cases, this may be different than the
main issue raised in a case also mentioned in the comment. 115 Also recall
that the unit of analysis is the change of speaker so a single comment containing two privileged (or two firm) responses would appear in the data as a
single privileged (or single firm) response. 116 Nominees also at times will
invoke the privilege on a case or issue only to provide a firm answer when
the issue is reframed or pressed later in the hearing, or give more than one
type of response to a question involving a named case (which is why some
case names appear on both Table 1 and Table 2). Finally, not all firm or
privileged responses include named cases. Nonetheless, the following Tables provide useful comparative insight into the different ways nominees
are responding at their hearings.
Table 1. The Issues and Cases in Which Ginsburg and Gorsuch Exercised Privilege
Issue
Civil Rights

115. Id.
116. Id.

Ginsburg
12.6% (26)

Gorsuch
9.4% (43)

Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
Buckley v. Valeo (1976)
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council
(1984)
Dred Scott v. Sandford
(1856)
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978)
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971)
Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan (1982)
Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)
Presley v. Etowah County
Commission (1972)
Roe v. Wade (1973)

Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
Bush v. Gore (2000)
Citizens United v. FEC
(2010)
District of Columbia v.
Heller (2008)
Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972)
Griswold v. Connecticut
(1965)
Planned Parenthood v.
Casey (1992)
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Labor and Employment

Education
Criminal Justice
National Defense
Technology

International
Affairs
Government
Operations

Federalism
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Rust v. Sullivan (1991)
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan
(1985)
Shaw v. Reno (1993)
Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists
(1986)
U.S. v. Miller (1939)
Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio (1989)

100% (3)
9.5% (4)
Herrera v. Collins (1993)

[Vol 93:2

5.1% (2)
Ute Indian Tribe of the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation v. Myton
(2016)
3.2% (1)
3.1% (1)

100% (2)
Action for Children's Television v. F.C.C. (1988)
Miami Herald v. Tornillo
(1974)
Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. F.C.C. (1969)
50% (1)
U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain
(1992)
11.8% (2)
Davis v. Passman (1979)
Walker v. Jones (1984)

13.8% (21)
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
(1944)
11.8% (2)
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and Water

Miscellaneous
Judicial Philosophy
Hearing Administration
Total Privileged
Responses
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32.3% (10)
Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council (1992)
Montana v. U. S. (1981)
Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission (1987)
South Dakota v. Bourland
(1993)
State of Washington v.
E.P.A. (1985)
U.S. v. Sioux Nation of Indians (1980)
5% (2)
7.4% (5)
Ex parte McCardle (1868)
U.S. v. Klein (1879)
55

2.9% (2)
4.9% (7)

2.6% (9)
89

Numerical entries represent the number of privileged responses each nominee gave in each category divided by the total number of statements they made in each category, expressed as a percentage.
Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of privileged responses each nominee provided in each
category. The case names represent the cases in each category in which nominees gave a privileged
response.

As shown in Table 1, both Ginsburg and Gorsuch used the privilege to
avoid offering opinions on the most contested issues of their respective
eras. Both nominees invoked the privilege to avoid talking about a slew of
controversial cases, particularly in regard to civil rights issues. Justice
Ginsburg also used the privilege more expansively to avoid an array of
issue areas outside that context, while Justice Gorsuch, perhaps in homage
to his predecessor in the seat, Justice Scalia, invoked it at one point to refuse to provide an opinion about the iconic case of Marbury v. Madison.117

117. Gorsuch affirmed 0DUEXU\ later in the hearing. Justice Scalia, however, frustrated senators by
refusing to affirm this seminal case at his 1986 confirmation hearing. See Howard Kurtz, Judicial
Reticence
Frustrates
Senators,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
9,
1986),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/09/09/judicial-reticence-frustratessenators/75c46649-998a-409b-8006-ef5f21e0efbb/?utm_term=.5e8482fcae65 [https://perma.cc/563NCJPS].
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Table 2. The Issues and Cases in Which Ginsburg and Gorsuch Took
Firm Positions
Issue
Civil Rights

Ginsburg
26.6% (55)
Coker v. Georgia (1977)
DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v.
Agency for Intern. Development (1989)
Dred Scott v. Sandford
(1856)
Federal Election Commission v. International
Funding Institute (1992)
Frontiero v. Richardson
(1973)
Goldman v. Secretary of
Defense (1984)
Korematsu v. U.S. (1944)
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971)
Lochner v. New York (1905)
Loving v. Virginia (1967)
Michael H. v. Gerald D.
(1989)
Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977)
Planned Parenthood v. Casey
(1992)
Poe v. Ullman (1961)
Presley v. Etowah County
Commission (1972)
Reed v. Reed (1971)
Roe v. Wade (1973)
Rust v. Sullivan (1991)
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan
(1985)
Skinner v. State of Oklahoma (1942)
Struck v. Secretary of Defense (1971)

1.5% (7)

Gorsuch

Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)
Pierce v. Society of Sisters
(1925)
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)

2018]

Labor and
Employment

Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld
(1975)
16.7% (1)

Conair v. N.L.R.B. (1983)
Fort Bragg Association of
Educators v. Federal Labor Relations Authority
(1989)
St. Francis Federation of
Nurses and Health Professionals v. N.L.R.B.
(1984)
Criminal Justice 9.5% (4)
Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
Banking and
Finance

Government
Operations
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25% (1)
Michigan Citizens for an
Independent Press v.
Thornburgh (1989)
Rothery Storage & Van v.
Atlas Van Lines (1986)
5.9% (1)

Federalism

Davis v. Passman (1979)
Walker v. Jones (1986)
33.3% (1)

Miscellaneous

Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
(1938)
Swift v. Tyson (1842)
10% (4)
Burnet v. Coronado Oil &
Gas (1932)
Dellums v. U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission
(1988)
Di Santo v. Pennsylvania
(1927)

3.2% (1)
Gideon v. Wainwright
(1963)
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Total Firm
Responses

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
(1938)
Swift v. Tyson (1842)
22.1% (15)
Burnet v. Coronado Oil &
Gas (1932)
Dred Scott v. Sandford
(1856)
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
Worcester v. Georgia (1932)
82
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1.4% (2)
Marbury v. Madison (1803)

10

Numerical entries represent the number of firm answers each nominee gave in each category divided by the total number of statements they made in each category, expressed as a percentage. Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of firm answers each nominee provided in each category. The
case names represent the cases in each category in which nominees took a firm position.

The issues and cases on which Ginsburg and Gorsuch provided firm
answers are more varied than those on which they invoked the privilege. As
shown on Table 2, while both nominees initially deferred on questions in
which Brown was mentioned, Ginsburg later firmly asserted her understanding that the case was correctly decided. Ginsburg also provided firm
opinions in eight times as many civil rights comments as did Gorsuch, including not only her affirmations of canonical cases such as Loving v. Virginia and Reed v. Reed, but also of the more controversial Roe v. Wade and
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
Comparing the privileged and firm response type data allows us to
generate what we call a “responsiveness ratio.” The responsiveness ratio is
a simple comparison between the percentage of firm responses given by a
nominee relative to the percentage of privileged responses given by the
same nominee. This is calculated by subtracting the percentage of privileged responses from the percentage of firm responses for each nominee. A
positive response ratio shows that a nominee provided more firm answers
than privileged responses, while a negative responsiveness ratio shows the
opposite. Since the ratio is calculated as a percentage of responses given by
the nominee, it sensibly can be used to compare nominees across time even
as the confirmation hearings themselves become longer and more in-depth.
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Table 3. The Percentage of Firm and Privileged Responses Given by Supreme Court Nominees, 1939–2017
Nominee

Percentage
Firm

Percentage
Privilege

Difference

Frankfurter (1939)

4.55

1.52

3.03

Jackson (1941)

0.00

0.00

0.00

Harlan (1955)

0.42

5.91

-5.49

Brennan (1957)

4.31

14.66

-10.34

Whittaker (1957)

0.00

0.00

0.00

Stewart (1959)

7.18

3.35

3.83

White (1962)

0.00

0.00

0.00

Goldberg (1962)

0.00

1.45

-1.45

Fortas (1965)

3.26

3.26

0.00

Marshall (1967)

0.64

6.86

-6.22

Fortas (1968)

0.00

24.94

-24.94

Thornberry (1968)

3.41

10.23

-6.82

Burger (1969)

8.33

4.17

4.17

Haynsworth (1969)

0.32

0.48

-0.16

Carswell (1970)

0.00

1.59

-1.59

Blackmun (1970)

1.11

2.22

-1.11

Rehnquist (1971)

11.16

12.42

-1.26

Powell (1971)

3.54

2.53

1.01

Stevens (1975)

9.39

3.76

5.63

O'Connor (1981)

6.30

3.84

2.47

Rehnquist (1986)

2.34

2.61

-0.28

Scalia (1986)

7.17

8.14

-0.98

Bork (1987)

7.75

0.82

6.93

Kennedy (1987)

3.77

1.08

2.69

Souter (1990)

8.64

3.90

4.74

Thomas (1991)

10.18

3.15

7.03

Ginsburg (1993)

15.44

10.36

5.08

Breyer (1994)

8.29

3.55

4.74

Roberts (2005)

2.28

6.60

-4.32
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Nominee

Percentage
Firm

Percentage
Privilege

Difference

Alito (2006)

9.74

3.51

6.23

Sotomayor (2009)

4.50

1.58

2.92

Kagan (2010)

0.99

1.48

-0.49

Gorsuch (2017)

0.75

6.66

-5.91

As shown in Table 3, Ginsburg has a responsiveness ratio of +5.05.
Gorsuch in contrast has a –5.86 responsiveness ratio. This is a more than 10
percent responsiveness gap. This is consistent with the qualitative review of
the hearing transcripts, showing how Gorsuch adopted Ginsburg’s practice
of not commenting on cases or issues (Ginsburg’s First Rule) and but did
not adopt her practice of affirmatively accepting cases and issues firmly
ensconced in the constitutional canon (Ginsburg’s Second Rule).
As close followers of the Supreme Court confirmation process, we
find this troubling. Nominees rarely opine on the most controversial issues
of their day, but most nominees—and all recent nominees—have expressed
their acceptance of previously contested cases and issues that have become
settled over time. This practice allows the Supreme Court confirmation
hearings to add real value to our constitutional discourse. It provides a forum at which nominees accept, in public and under oath, the current constitutional consensus, and thereby provides a key mechanism through which
the Court’s previously controversial constitutional choices are validated. It
also allows senators and the American public to understand clearly what
cases and issues a nominee in fact considers settled—in other words, what
the nominee considers to be on- and off- the constitutional wall. 118
Gorsuch himself appeared to recognize the value of a process that
provides this information. When talking about the power of precedent, he
acknowledged the important role that settling previous disputes has in constitutional law. Precedent, he said, over time means that “what was once a
hotly contested issue is no longer a hotly contested issue. We move forward.” 119 Nonetheless, he refused to contribute to that process by affirming
his acceptance of the Court’s previously controversial but now settled cases.
This is disappointing. Supreme Court nominees’ adherence to the second Ginsburg Rule helps navigate the challenge of reconciling U.S. style
118. Jack M. Balkin, The Framework Model and Constitutional Interpretation, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 247–50 (David Dysenhaus & Malcom Thorburn eds., 2016).
119. Gorsuch Transcript, Mar. 21, 2017, supra note 29, at 9.
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judicial review with a more than 200-year-old constitutional text. Almost
by definition, cases with clear legal answers do not make it to the Supreme
Court. The Court only hears between seventy and eighty cases a year.
These usually are cases in which very able judges across the country have
disagreed about the correct answer to the legal question presented. In constitutional cases, they more often than not are disputes involving some of
the most open-textured language found in our Constitution, language like
“equal protection,” “freedom of speech,” and “liberty.”
Consequently, legal craftsmanship, while a critical part of a Supreme
Court Justice’s job, is rarely sufficient to decide hard cases. In case after
case, Justices also must exercise judgment. They must take the hodgepodge
of possibilities rendered by legal tools and mold them into a coherent body
of law consistent with our most fundamental Constitutional commitments.
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), speaking at the 1981 confirmation
hearing of Sandra Day O’Connor, captured this idea in stressing to
O’Connor the importance of the Senate’s role in the confirmation process.
No one, he said:
[C]an now safely forecast the issues that will dominate the coming years
on the Court, but certain questions never will and never should go
away—how to balance the powers among the branches of Government
and how to maintain the Court’s coequal status while serving as the ultimate forum on the actions of other branches and States, will always be
perplexing. The right answers have never been obvious, and they will not
be during the time you serve on that Court. So far in our history there has
been a remarkable acceptance of judicial interpretations, a willingness to
make the necessary changes to conform to judicial mandate. 120

For at least the past fifty years, nominees have helped navigate this
terrain by carefully balancing their privilege to avoid some questions with a
recognition that they have a corresponding duty to answer others. Every
member of the Supreme Court sitting at the time of Justice Scalia’s death
had confirmed to this two-tiered model. But by relying heavily on the first
Ginsburg Rule while disregarding the second, Judge Gorsuch did not.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the so-called “Ginsburg Rule” repeatedly
invoked by both the nominee and Senate Judiciary Committee members at
Neil Gorsuch’s Supreme Court Confirmation hearing. Using both qualita120. The Nomination of Judge Sandra Day O’Connor of Arizona to Serve as an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong.
14 (1981).
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tive and quantitative analysis to compare the Ginsburg and Gorsuch testimony, we have revealed three things.
First, the “Ginsburg Rule” is badly named. Supreme Court nominees
testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee have invoked a privilege
to not answer questions about hotly-contested constitutional cases since
nominee testimony began in 1939. Justice Ginsburg invoked this privilege
at her 1993 hearing, but she certainly did not create it.
Second, the “Ginsburg Rule” really should be referred to as the
“Ginsburg Rules.” As our examination of the data reveals, nominee Ginsburg invoked the privilege to not answer certain questions in a higher percentage of her comments than did most other nominees, but she balanced
those invocations with an unsurpassed willingness to use her testimony to
affirm her agreement with the constitutional consensus of her era. In doing
so, she respected the important role the confirmation hearings play in
providing public validation of previously contested, but now well-settled
constitutional cases and controversies.
Third, we demonstrated that Neil Gorsuch rigorously followed the
first Ginsburg Rule by refusing to answer questions about hotly-contested
cases, but disregarded the second by repeatedly failing to affirm his agreement with previously contested but now settled constitutional cases. As our
analysis demonstrates, this combination of responses from Gorsuch generated an overall responsiveness ratio much lower than Justice Ginsburg’s,
and lower than any other nominee since 1968.
We concluded by expressing our disappointment with this aspect of
the Gorsuch testimony, and sharing our hope, as close observers of the
confirmation process, that future nominees truly do take their lead from
Justice Ginsburg and, unlike Justice Gorsuch, take care to follow both of
the Ginsburg Rules.

